Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 2: The Country Studies -- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico by Edward Buffie
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume
2: The Country Studies -- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,  Mexico
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey D. Sachs, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press, 1990
Volume ISBN: 0-226-73333-5
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sach90-1
Conference Date: September 21-23, 1987
Publication Date: January 1990
Chapter Title: Import Compression, Real Wages, and Underemployment
Chapter Author: Edward Buffie
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8960
Chapter pages in book: (p. 465 - 486)465  Mexico/Chapter 6 
low levels: total real credit to the private sector was 11.7 percent lower in 
1986 than in  1978, and the share of M4 in GDP was at its lowest level since 
1965. Finally, private investment was further depressed by  the manner in 
which fiscal cuts were achieved. No doubt a substantial reduction in parastatal 
investment spending was necessary, but investment expenditures for infra- 
structure capital were also severely slashed. As  many types of infrastructure 
capital enhance the productivity of private sector capital, the latter cutbacks, 
like import compression  and  the  reduction  in  bank  lending, lowered the 
profitability of private investment. 
Once  investment  declines,  it  is  easy  for  the  economy  to  slip  into  a 
downward spiral in which capital decumulation, rising inflation, and growing 
fiscal deficits become mutually reinforcing. As  lower investment rates take 
their toll on the capital stock, output declines and inflation accelerates. For a 
given level of real government expenditures, the decline in real output widens 
the fiscal deficit by lowering real tax revenues. If the larger deficit is financed 
by  printing money, inflation rises further (the budget is “balanced”  by  the 
inflation tax), triggering a new round of financial disintermediation and capital 
decumulation.  If  an  attempt is made to  contain  inflationary pressures by 
covering the revenue shortfall through greater bond sales, the bond rate jumps 
upward and again the outcome is further financial disintermediation, capital 
decumulation, and intensified inflationary pressures. 
In the next two chapters, formal theoretical models are developed in an 
attempt to gain a fuller understanding of the factors that seem to be driving 
the Mexican economy into a low growth, low real wage, high inflation, high 
underemployment equilibrium. In chapter 6 I analyze the repercussions of 
import compression on real wages and underemployment, while chapter 7 is 
an investigation of  the links between capital accumulation, inflation, fiscal 
deficits, and financial disintermediation. 
6  Import Compression, Real 
Wages, and Underemployment 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of  the post-1982 adjustment process has 
been  the  imposition  of  an  extreme and  unprecedented  degree of  import 
compression upon the private sector. Highly restrictive quotas were placed 
on imports of  all types between 1982 and 1984 as part of a comprehensive 
stabilization program  aimed  first and  foremost  at  eliminating the  current 
account deficit. On 25 July 1985, a large number of quotas were eliminated, 
but, until very recently, import controls (licenses, high “reference”  prices 466  Edward F.  Buffie 
and  domestic  content  requirements)  were  widespread.  Even  now  that 
liberalization  is quite far along, a  severely  depreciated  peso has  kept  the 
import volume heavily depressed. 
In this  chapter,  I construct  a simple  model  showing  how  import quotas 
affect  the  price  level,  underemployment,  and  the  payments  balance.  The 
model suggests that import compression  has been one of the critical causal 
factors underlying the post-1982 slide into low growth, declining real wages, 
and  worsening  underemployment.  Under  very  weak  conditions,  a  tighter 
quota on imported  inputs used  by  the protected  (or nontradables) manufac- 
turing sector produces open unemployment in the short run. Over time, open 
unemployment  diminishes  and  is  eventually  eliminated  altogether  as  the 
nominal (and real) wage outside the manufacturing sector declines.  Even in 
the long run,  however, the contractionary effects of import compression do 
not fully  disappear; if  the import restrictions  are maintained,  the economy 
settles  into  a  new  steady-state  equilibrium  characterized  by  permanently 
higher underemployment  and lower real output. 
The economy is not necessarily recompensed for tolerating high underem- 
ployment and low real wages by a strong improvement in the trade balance. 
In fact, if quotas are highly restrictive (in the sense of generating large implicit 
tariffs)  and  nontradables  and  tradables  are  relatively  good  substitutes  in 
consumption, the trade balance worsens. This is, perhaps, an extreme result, 
but  it  serves  to  underscore  the  point  that  the  cumulative  trade  surplus 
generated by a prolonged recession may be disappointingly small. This seems 
to  be  roughly  consistent  with  recent  Mexican  experience:  sizable  trade 
surpluses were achieved in  1983 and  1984, but payments  difficulties resur- 
faced  by  the  end  of  1985, when  the  economy  was  still  deeply  mired  in 
recession. 
In section 6.3  I demonstrate that higher internal energy prices are also likely 
to have contributed to the protracted post-1982 recession.  An increase in the 
domestic price of oil exacerbates underemployment in much the same fashion 
as  import  compression.  The overall  impact  on  output  and  the  payments 
balance may be either positive or  negative depending on how the magnitude 
of the loss from a more severely distorted labor market compares to the direct 
efficiency gain brought about by reducing the gap between the domestic and 
world market price of oil. 
Given the difficulties associated with using  import restrictions to redress 
payments  deficits,  it  is  natural  to  ask  whether  other policies  offer  more 
favorable macroeconomic tradeoffs. This issue is tackled in sections 6.4 and 
6.5, where the effectiveness of devaluation and export subsidies is analyzed. 
Devaluation  succeeds in  improving the trade balance but is contractionary: 
real output always declines,  and if  tradables sector technology  is relatively 
inflexible,  the adjustment process entails open unemployment  and declining 
real wages over the short and medium run. Export subsidies usually exert a 
more favorable effect  upon  labor demand  and  have  the  potential  to simul- 467  Mexico/Chapter 6 
taneously improve the payments balance and reduce underemployment pro- 
vided they are financed by  tax increases. 
6.1  A Simple Macroeconomic Model With Import Quotas 
The main  message I  wish  to  convey is  that  import compression gives 
rise  to  severe  macroeconomic  problems  largely  through  adverse  effects 
operating on the  supply  side. Accordingly, the  model that  follows has a 
very  simple macroeconomic structure along the  lines of  models found  in 
the  monetary  approach  to  the  balance  of  payments  (Dornbusch  1973, 
1974; Frenkel  and  Johnson  1976). The economy produces  two  goods,  a 
nontradedlquota-protected manufactured  good  and  an  export  good.  (An 
exogenous, oil-earning sector may be added to the model, in which case the 
economy may be a net importer of the so called “export”  good.) Each good 
is  produced  by  labor,  a  noncompetitive  imported  input,  and  fixed, 
sector-specific  capital  under  conditions  of  constant  returns  to  scale. 
Consumer imports have  already  been  banned  (or are  negligible), so that 
when  balance  of  payments  problems  arise,  foreign  exchange  rationing 
necessarily entails a reduction in imports of  intermediate inputs. ’ (In 1986, 
consumer imports were 5.5 percent of total private sector imports.) There is 
no government sector, no banking system, and no capital accumulation. In 
addition, it is assumed that all wealth is held in  the form of  high-powered 
money; nothing substantive changes if  domestic residents are also permitted 
to hold a foreign currency denominated asset. 
The economy is small in  world markets, and units are chosen so that all 
world market prices equal unity. The peso price of the export good, P,,  thus 
equals the exchange rate, e: 
(1)  P, = e. 
Firms  in  each  sector  are  perfectly  competitive.  Perfect  Competition 
together with constant returns to scale implies that the zero profit condition 
obtains: 
Pi  = ~’(w’,  g’, r’),  i  = n,x, 
where C’,  wi, g’, and ri  are, respectively, the unit cost function, the nominal 
wage, the price of  the  imported input,  and  the capital rental  in  sector i. 
Different g’ are specified in order to allow for the possibility that quotas will 
be imposed in one sector but not the other; in particular, many governments 
appear to find the direct but naive policy of rationing imported inputs to the 
nontradables sector-the  sector that does not earn foreign exchange-to  be 
an attractive method of  treating a payments deficit. 
The wage  also differs across sectors. This reflects the  functioning of  a 
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power of unions or adjustments in a binding minimum wage ensure that the 
nominal wage responds at least partially to general increases in the price level: 
(3)  +" = a(ynPn+yxPx),  yx+yn=l,  a  =z  1, 
where  yi is  the  consumption  share of  good  i;  a is  the  wage  indexation 
parameter, and a circumflex denotes the percentage  change  in a variable.  I 
treat  a as  an  exogenous, politically  determined  variable  and  characterize 
later results in terms of cuts in the real wage required to avoid a worsening in 
underemployment.  It  would  be  preferable,  of  course,  to  have  a  more 
complete  model  in  which  ci  was  determined  endogenously.  Unfortunately, 
empirical  knowledge  about  the  wage-setting  process  in  Mexico  is  very 
limited and does not permit one to choose with much confidence any of  the 
competing theories of wage rigidity  (implicit contracts, the efficiency  wage 
hypothesis, optimizing unions,  etc.). 
Although  wage  rigidity  is  not  confined  exclusively  to  the  protected 
manufacturing  sector,  it  is  clear  that  labor  markets  are considerably  more 
competitive elsewhere in the economy. In 1977 average earnings of agricul- 
tural laborers were 34 percent of those in the industrial sector and 70.8 percent 
of the labor force in agriculture earned less than the minimum wage.'  In view 
of these stylized facts, I assume both that wx  is substantially below W" and that 
wx  adjusts so as to clear the labor market.3 The degree of wage flexibility in 
the  export  sector,  however,  is  asymmetric;  wx rises  instantaneously  to 
eliminate  any excess  demand  but  is  inflexible  in  the  downward  direction, 
declining slowly in response to the pressure created by open unemployment: 
(4)  WXI  = p(L" + L"  -  L),  p > 0, 
L"  + L" < L 
where L'  stands for employment  in sector  i, L  is the fixed supply of labor, 
and an overdot signifies a time derivative. 
Employing Shephard's lemma, the sectoral labor demands may be stated 
as 
where Qi  is output in sector  i.  Similarly, the market-clearing  conditions for 
the sector-specific capital stocks, K', and the sectoral allocation of  imported 
inputs, z',  are 
(7)  I'  = CiQ'. 
Equations ( 1)-(7)  characterize  supply behavior.  The remaining equations 
complete the model by specifying the demand side of the economy  and the 
dynamics of wealth accumulation. 469  Mexico/Chapter  6 
References are homothetic, and demand depends upon prices and total 
consumption expenditure, E. P, fluctuates to continuously clear the market: 
(8)  D"(P,, P,, E) = Q" . 
Expenditure, by definition, is the difference between income, Y,  and savings, S: 
(9)  E=Y-S, 
where income is the sum of private sector value-added and import premiums 
accruing to license holders: 
(10)  Y  = R(P,, P,,  gx, g",  L", L") + (g" -  e)Zx + (g" -  e)Zn . 
R  is the private sector value-added function and  possesses the properties: 
Finally, saving is motivated by the difference between the desired and the 
actual stock of  wealth. In the current model, wealth is held entirely in the 
form of domestic money, M.  Assuming desired wealth is a fixed multiple, h, 
of income, the savings function takes the form 
aRiapi = ei,  aRiagi =  -zi,  aRiaLi = wi. 
(11)  S = @(hY -  M),  CD > 0. 
The nominal money  stock is fixed in the short run but changes over time 
through the trade balance, B. From (9) and (10): 
(12)  M=B=S. 
Equation (12) is the classic specie-flow mechanism: the trade balance is the 
vehicle through which saving brings the actual stock of wealth into equality 
with its desired level. 
6.2  Import Compression 
Suppose the  government finds itself  faced  with  increased debt service 
obligations and attempts to engineer a series of  trade balance surpluses by 
restricting the supply of imported inputs to firms operating in the nontradables 
sector. The rationale typically put forward on behalf of this policy is that the 
imposition of quotas is less inflationary than a comparable devaluation of the 
currency (though this is far from obvious) and that the export sector should be 
exempt from restrictions since it processes imported inputs in order to em 
foreign exchange. What, if  any, are the merits of this argument? 
To figure out the repercussions on employment and prices, differentiate (5) 
and  utilize  Uzawa's  result  that  uij = C,C/CiCj , where  uij is  the  Allen 
partial  elasticity  of  substitution between  factors i  and j. While  it  is  not 
difficult to work out a set of  fully general results, little of  interest is lost if, 
for algebraic simplicity, production functions are assumed to be  separable 
between  primary  factors  and  imported  inputs,  viz.:  a,  = uKI = avI  , 
where uvI  is the elasticity of substitution between value-added and imported 470  Edward F.  Buffie 
inputs.  Letting 8;  represent  the  cost  share of  factor j  in  sector  i,  in  the 
appendix to this chapter I show that in the separable case 
(13) 
(14) 
jn = alpn -  u2g" 
P'  = blp,, - b27', 
where 
As expected, a,,  b, , and b, are all positive. The unconditional cross-price 
elasticity (-a,)  is  negative.  A  higher price  for  the  imported  input  both 
contracts  the  profit-maximizing level  of  output  and  induces  substitution 
toward  labor.  With  a  separable  production  function  (or  any  production 
function for which  [uu - uK,]  is not  extremely large),  the output effect 
dominates, making L"  and I"  gross complements. 
In  the  export  sector,  the  output  price  and  the  price  of  the  imported 
intermediate  are  fixed  at  e, the  nominal  exchange  rate.  Employment, 
therefore, varies only insofar as the nominal wage changes: 
(15)  i"  =  -a3GX, 
where 
a3 = (1 - e;)  [u~~(i  - e;)  + u;,,e;l  > 0. 
When labor demand in the nontradables sector increases, wx  is bid upward to 
clear the labor market and L"  declines. If L"  falls, w"  is temporarily rigid and 
L"  is unchanged in the short run. 
The equilibrium value of P, is found from the market-clearing condition 
(8). Choosing units so that P, =  1 initially and noting that  $" = 0;fi" + 
O;p, (8), (9), and (11) yield 
(16)  (0;  - Q'W;u,  - Q"e;b,)p, + Q78;u2 + 8,"b2)r=~,(1  -s)dY, 
where ci denotes the marginal propensity to consume good i, and  s = @h, 
the short-run marginal propensity to save. Defining t = g" - 1, the implicit 
tariff on I", from (10) and (13) we have 
(17)  d~  = ~"(i  - e;fa,)P,, - pe;a,g.  + tdi" 
in  the  case  where  L"   decline^.^  Substituting  for  Y  in  (16)  from  (17), 
employing the Slutsky decomposition, and collecting terms yields 471  MexicoIChapter 6 
(18) 
where 
fop, + fig" = c,(l -  s)tffZ", 
and  E  is  the compensated own-price elasticity of  demand for nontradables 
and is defined to be positive. 
Equations (14) and (18) can be solved for P, and P,. Unsurprisingly, a 
more restrictive quota always raises both prices: 
where 
A =  (E + C,4b2 + e;(cx + c,s)u;,(i  -  y,a)[~:~(i -  e;)  + u;,e;pe;  >  0. 
Turning back to (13) and substituting the above solutions for P, and g", 
we obtain, after simplification, the following critical condition: 
i" 
-  5 0, as E + c,s  S u;,(l  -  y,a)  i"  (21) 
Figure  6.1  illustrates  the  conflicting  factors  influencing  nontradables 
labor  demand.  The  reduction  in  imported  intermediates simultaneously 
shifts the marginal product schedule leftward and cuts the product wage Wn 
by  pushing  up  P,.  If  there  is  little  substitutability  between  imported 
intermediates and domestic factors (avr  small), employment is likely to fall 
as the labor demand curve is steeply sloped and the leftward shift of  the 
schedule is large. The extent to which P, increases depends on the degree of 
substitutability between nontradables and exportables (E),  the reduction in 
demand elicited by  the  fall  in  real  wealth  (c,s),  and  the  contraction in 
demand  stemming  from  the  direct  fall  in  real  income  caused  by  the 
tightening of the quota [c,(l  -  s)t(l + t)-'].  For any given decline in P,, 
the product wage falls by the amount (1 -  y,a).  Large values of  E, c,,  t, a, 
and 'y,  thus limit the fall in the product wage and increase the probability of 
a decline in labor demand. 
Though there are circumstances in  which employment increases, in my 
view (21) argues that a contractionary outcome is likely. On the right side, 
uv, is  scaled  down by  the  product  of  two  fractions.  Thus,  employment 472  Edward F.  Buffie 
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Fig. 6.1  The impact of a tighter quota on labor demand in  the 
nontradables sector 
contracts unless the degree of  substitutability is considerably greater on the 
supply side than on the demand side. Observe as well that deindexation of 
wages does not necessarily suffice to prevent a reduction in labor demand-a 
nominal wage cut may be required.  The value of a  that leaves employment 
unchanged is 
I 
E + c,s 
[l -  C"(1 -  s)t/(l + t)]u$, 
a* = y;l'  1 -  [ 
' 
which is negative, for example, when  (E + c,s)  > uv,. Even when u$, is 
relatively  large,  the  requisite  value  of  a will  often  be  extremely  low, 
particularly if t is initially nontrivial in magnitude. Table 6.1 shows how a* 
varies with uv, ,  E, and t when c, = yn = 0.50 and s  = 0.20. In all cases 
where uv, =S  2~ and t 3  0.20, a*  is far below unity. 
Consider next the question of whether import restrictions are efficacious in 
strengthening the trade balance. From (11) and (12) it is seen that the trade 
balance improves when nominal  income rises,  inducing increased  savings. 
The general solution, therefore, may be obtained by replacing P,  and g" in 
(17) by the expressions in (19) and (20). However, given that my objective is 
only to show that there is no strong presumption in favor of an improvement 
in the trade balance,  in the remainder of this section I  shall derive results 
under the following two simplifying  assumptions:  (1)  there is a rigid  real 
wage in the protected  manufacturing sector (a  = l), and  (2) the nontrad- 
ables sector production function is  fully  separable (avr  = a,  = u,).  In 
this case, it turns out that the trade balance worsens if and only if 413  MexicoKhapter 6 
Table 6.1  Critical Degree of Real Wage Rigidity (a*) 
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The trade balance is likely to deteriorate when the impact upon the price 
level is comparatively weak and the reduction in real income due to lower 
employment and the worsening of the trade distortion is comparatively large. 
As expected in light of the previous analysis of  the employment outcome, 
the rise in P,  is small relative to the real income loss when E, t,  and 0;:  are 
large and an  is small. Viewed from another angle, under these circumstances 
the  trade  balance worsens because the  rise  in P,  induces  an  increase  in 
consumption of  the exportable  that  lowers export  earnings by  an amount 
exceeding the enforced reduction in intermediates imports. 
What is surprising about the condition stated in (22) is that,  if  existing 
quotas are somewhat restrictive, there is no general presumption that the trade 
balance will improve. For t  = 0, (22) requires implausibly large values of E. 
But  when t is on the order of  0.30 or more, the trade balance may worsen 
when  E assumes believable  values.  For  example,  with  yx = cx = 0.25, 
6;  = t  = 0.40, and an  = 0.50, trade deficits arise whenever E > 1.06. 
So far,  I have dealt only with the short run.  Beyond the short run,  the 
payments  balance  alters  the  stock  of  money  balances  and  wx begins  to 
decline as workers laid off in the nontradables sector seek employment in the 
export sector. Can it be hoped that after these adjustments are complete the 
contractionary effect  of  import  compression  will  be  reversed  or  at  least 
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Figure 6.2 depicts the nature of the adjustment process. The MM  and LL 
schedules reflect, respectively, the set of points for which the trade balance is 
zero and the labor market clears. These schedules are derived by substituting 
the reduced-form solutions for Y and L'  into (4) and (1  1): 
(23) 
(24) 
ni = B  = @[hY(M,  w")  -  MI 
W"  = P[L"(M,  w")  + L"(w") -  L], 
LT  > 0,  Y2,  LY,  L'f  < 0,  hY, - 1 < 0. 
A higher level of  wealth reduces savings (hY, < l), thereby worsening the 
trade balance. The MM  schedule, therefore, is negatively sloped: a fall in w" 
to  encourage  exportables production  is  needed  when M rises  if  a  trade 
balance deficit is to be  averted. To  the  right of MM  there is a  payments 
deficit and M is falling, while to the left the payments balance registers a 
surplus and M is rising. 
The LL  schedule is positively sloped as a larger money stock drives up P,  and 
stimulates employment in the high-wage nontradables sector, thus drawing labor 
out of  the export sector and bidding up w".  Above LL,  open unemployment 
exists and w'  is falling. Points below the LL schedule are irrelevant since w'  is 
upwardly flexible; once the economy arrives at a point on LL south of B, the 
adjustment path moves  up the LL schedule until the long-run equilibrium is 
reached. The adjustment process is thus globally stable. 
Following the  imposition of  a  tighter quota,  the  long-run value of  the 
export sector wage is obtained by the requirement that the labor market clear 
when saving is zero. Since wx  and L"  move in the same direction in the long 
run., the qualitative outcome can be determined simply by  setting s = 0 in 
(21). This yields dL"/dI", dw"ldI" < 0 if  and only if 
0  M 
Fig. 6.2  Import compression in the nontradables sector 475  Mexicotchapter 6 
Given that s is usually small, the prospects for reducing underemployment 
do not  improve much in the long run. As with the short-run outcome, real 
income will be lower and underemployment greater in the new  steady state 
unless the degree of substitutability  on the supply side far exceeds that on the 
demand side. 
The  cumulative impact  upon  the  payments  balance  turns  on  whether 
nominal income rises after wx has adjusted to clear the labor market. From 
(10) and (1  3), the change in nominal income in the long run is 
(26)  dy = unpee(i -  $1  {[(Y,  + ~,ey)ie;tlS, - (ey/ert)p}  + td", 
where J, = wX/w"  < 1. Solving for the long-run changes in P,  and g"  and 
substituting these into (26) yields 
as the necessary and sufficient condition for a cumulative payments surplus. 
The  condition  for  a  cumulative surplus is  less  stringent than  that  for  a 
short-run surplus, reflecting the fact that, in the long run, those laid off in 
the high-wage manufacturing sector find employment in the export sector. 
The likelihood of an initial payments deficit being reversed in the long run is 
sensitive to  the  magnitude  of  the  sectoral wage  gap.  Inspection of  (27) 
suggests that, whatever may happen in the short run, if  the labor market is 
not extremely distorted  (IJJ >  OSO), wage  flexibility in  the export  sector 
eventually  succeeds  in  generating  a  cumulative  payments  surplus.  In 
subsequent analysis, I assume (27) is satisfied so that the nominal money 
stock rises across steady states. 
In  figure 6.2, path ABC portrays the nature of  the  adjustment process 
when (25) holds and the payments balance improves in the short run. Point A 
is the initial equilibrium. When the import quota is reduced, the LL and MM 
schedules shift horizontally to the right  and  C becomes the new  long-run 
equilibrium. A payments surplus emerges, but labor demand contracts in the 
nontradables sector and  the economy  immediately goes into a  recession, 
experiencing  open  unemployment.  Over  phase  AB,  payments  surpluses 
increase the money supply and the soft labor market depresses w". Higher 
employment in  the export sector and expansion in  the money supply both 
raise nontradables demand. Consequently, P,, continues to rise and L" begins 
to recover from its initial decline.  By  the time point B is reached, open 
unemployment has  been  eliminated but  the  trade balance still exhibits a 
surplus.  As  the money stock increases further, the path moves up  the LL 
schedule. During this second phase, there is continuous full employment and 
P,,  L",  and wx  all increase steadily. The payments surplus finally disappears 476  Edward F.  Buffie 
at point C and the economy then settles into a new  steady-state equilibrium 
characterized by  a lower nominal (and real) export sector wage and higher 
underemployment. 
It was demonstrated earlier that when import quotas are already in place 
and  are generating sizable implicit tariffs,  it  is quite possible that further 
import compression will,  paradoxically,  worsen  the  payments  balance  in 
the  short run.  Path  DEFC corresponds to  this case.  On  impact, the MM 
schedule shifts downward and LL  shifts horizontally to the right. The trade 
balance  deteriorates at  the  same  time  as  employment  and  real  output 
contract, and the economy heads off on a southwesterly path with both wx 
and  M  declining.  The  payments  deficits  persist  until  the  recession  has 
extracted a sufficiently large decrease in  the  real  export sector wage and 
the economy finds itself at point E on the MM schedule. Thereafter, further 
decreases in wx give rise to payments surpluses and  the remainder of the 
path is similar to that of ABC. 
6.3.1 
In the preceding section I assumed that import controls were imposed only 
on firms operating in the protected manufacturing sector; export sector firms 
continued to have access to imported inputs at world market prices. In fact, 
it  is improbable that exportables production will  not  be  affected to  some 
extent  by  import  restrictions.  When  import  compression  assumes  the 
massive proportions it did in Mexico in 1982-83,  some export sector firms 
will inevitably be subject to controls. Furthermore, the government may not 
be  able to completely segment the market, in  which case higher prices for 
intermediates used  by  firms in the  nontradables sector will  spill over and 
raise input prices for firms engaged in export production. 
To  see  how  this  affects  the  macroeconomic  repercussions  of  import 
restrictions, reverse the treatment of  firms in  the export and  nontradables 
sectors: let  import restrictions fall entirely upon  export  sector firms and 
allow  nontradables  sector  firms  unrestricted  access  to  imports  at  world 
market prices. In  terms of  the model developed in  section 6.1, set g"  = e 
and  treat  I"  and  g"  as  endogenous variables  and  fx as  an  exogenous 
variable. 
Clearly, import compression is now  an unmitigated disaster. Under the 
usual,  weak  assumption  that  intermediate  inputs  and  labor  are  gross 
complements, employment in the export sector contracts. The reduction in 
export sector value-added lowers the demand for nontradables, depressing 
P, and  causing employment in the nontradables sector to also contract. To 
make matters  still worse,  the  payments deficit widens.  (Nominal income 
falls,  including a decrease in  savings.)  The new  long-run equilibrium in 
figure 6.3 (0)  thus lies southwest of the initial equilibrium (A), and after the 
import quota is tightened, both  wx and M  start decreasing. If  the  export 
wage does not exhibit substantial downward flexibility, wx and M overshoot 
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their new,  lower  steady-state values and  the  adjustment process entails a 
protracted recession with open unemployment prevailing over the entire ABC 
stretch of the transition path. 
In practice,  of  course,  import restrictions are seldom confined to  firms 
operating in one sector or the other. The main point of  this analysis is that 
import  compression is more likely to be  contractionary and less likely to 
improve  the  payments  balance  the  more  import  controls  impinge  upon 
export production. Clearly, one could argue on the basis of these results that 
the  large  trade  surpluses  Mexico  achieved  in  1983  and  1984  reflected 
primarily the impact of extremely contractionary monetary and fiscal policies 
and  that  the  surpluses would  have  been  larger had  import  controls been 
loosened instead  of  tightened.  While  a  careful empirical  study would  be 
needed  to  evaluate  this  argument,  at  the  very  least  the  recent  Mexican 
experience strongly suggests that point C in figure 6.2 is way  south but not 
far to the east of point A;  import compression purchases a small cumulative 
payments surplus at the very dear price of  much greater underemployment 
and much lower real wages. 
6.3  Raising Internal Energy Prices 
In  recent  years,  the  internal  price  of  petroleum  has  been  increased 
substantially  in  Mexico.  The  usual  justification  for  this  policy  is  that 
Mexican  users  should pay  a price  closer to (ideally,  equal to)  the  world 
market price, which presumably reflects the opportunity cost of domestic oil 
consumption. By now it should be clear that this line of reasoning overlooks 
the  possibility  that  higher energy prices  will  lessen overall efficiency  by 
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this and the following two sections the analysis is limited to the case where 
the real wage is rigid in the manufacturing sector (a  = 1). 
The model employed earlier is easily adapted to  analyze the  impact of 
higher  domestic  oil  prices.  Set  g"  = g" = g,  where  g  is  the  common 
internal  price  of  energy,  and  interpret I'  in  equation  (7)  as  domestic 
consumption of  oil in sector i.  (I' is endogenously determined.) Also, let @ 
denote the fixed level of oil production and redefine R to be the gross output 
function R(Px,  P,, I" + I", L",  L"). With these changes, (10) becomes 
(10')  Y = R(P,, P,, I"  + I", L", L") + e(Q' - I" - I"). 
Equation (10') defines national income as output of  final goods and services 
plus oil exports. Differentiating with respect to g yields 
The last term measures the direct efficiency gain from lowering the domestic 
subsidy.  Due  to  this  direct  efficiency gain,  the  case  for  raising  internal 
energy prices is inherently more  favorable than  that  for  imposing import 
controls (where the  corresponding term  involves an efficiency loss).  The 
overall outcome, however, is highly uncertain as the direct efficiency gain 
has  to  be  weighted  against potential  losses  from  decreased employment. 
Since  labor  and  oil  are  gross  complements,  L"  always  declines.  In  the 
nontradables sector, employment rises or falls depending on whether 
where  T = e/g - 1 > 0.  The  right-side  term  picks  up  the  impact  on 
nontradables sector employment of  the change in export sector value-added 
measured at world market prices [e(p  + Q' -  Z")].  On the left side, the 
presence of  T  in  the term multiplying a;;  reflects the favorable impact on 
nontradables demand of the rise in income produced by the direct efficiency 
gain associated with lower usage of I". 
Given that the labor market cannot be reformed, it is unwise to completely 
eliminate  the  domestic  subsidy.  Trivially,  for  T = 0,  an  increase in  the 
domestic price of oil has the same effect as tightening import quotas (when 
t = 0  and  g"  = g"  = g).  Export  sector  employment  and  value-added 
decline.  Nontradables  sector  employment  and  value-added  also  decline 
unless, as usual, the degree of  substitutability is much greater on the supply 
side than  on  the  demand  side.  With  the  term  on  the  right  side  in  (29) 
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While second-best considerations will normally call for a domestic price 
below  the world market price, it should be  stressed that there are distinct 
limits to the magnitude of  the subsidy that can be justified. Note that when 
the domestic price is less than half  the world price (7 > l), export sector 
value-added always increases and 
E  + c,s  < U+f2YX 
is  a  suficient  condition  for L"  to  increase. Thus,  there  appears  to  be  a 
presumption that the very large subsidies of  the Lopez Portillo years were 
excessive and that some increase in internal prices was warranted after 1982. 
Several remarks are in order about the proper interpretation  of these results. 
First, the analysis applies only to energy consumption by firms; there is no 
justification for keeping the price of oil to consumers below the world price. 
Second,  the  size  of  the  optimal,  second-best energy  subsidy  might  be 
considerably larger when the repercussions on capital accumulation are taken 
into account. If other policies are not manipulated to maintain the profitability 
of investment, higher internal energy prices will trigger capital decumulation 
(on the usual assumption that capital and oil are gross complements) and 
impose welfare losses in the future by worsening the extent of underemploy- 
ment. (Even ignoring the adverse interaction with the labor market distortion, 
capital decumulation will give rise to welfare losses if the private discount rate 
exceeds the  social discount  rate.)  Third,  since the optimal policy  entails 
balancing the gain from less underemployment against the direct efficiency 
loss created by  driving a wedge between domestic and  world  prices, thc 
optimal  subsidy  will  obviously  be  larger  once  distributional effects  are 
incorporated into the welfare calculations. Indeed, given the current levels of 
underemployment and  real  wages in Mexico, distributional considerations 
may carry as much or more weight than concerns about efficiency. 
6.4  Devaluation 
Import controls, as  we  have  seen,  have  little to  recommend them.  In 
exchange for suffering permanent decreases in real output and real wages 
and a permanent increase in underemployment, the economy obtains nothing 
more  than  a  problematic  impact  on  the  payments  balance-there  is  no 
guarantee that the payments balance will  improve, or if  it  does, that the 
cumulative payments surplus will be sizable. (Of course, if  it were known 
that a payments deficit would result, the appropriate policy would be to relax 
import quotas.) Needless  to  say,  this  is  not  exactly  a  bargain,  and  it  is 
worthwhile to consider alternative policies in the hope of  finding a better 
deal. In the remainder of  this section, I analyze the merits of  the IMF and 
World Bank's favorite remedy, devaluation of the currency. Section 6.5 is an 
investigation of the case for export subsidies. 480  Edward F.  Buffie 
Viewed over the long run,  devaluation compares favorably with  import 
rationing.  With  a  rigid  real  wage  in  the  nontradables  sector,  the  real 
equilibrium is clearly not affected by  equiproportionate increases in e, P,, 
wx, and M.  Hence devaluation is neutral in the long run. This is shown in 
figure 6.4. The post-devaluation, long-run equilibrium lies at point C on the 
ray running from the origin through the initial equilibrium A. In the long run, 
all real variables are unchanged and the cumulative payments surplus as a 
fraction of  the money supply equals the percentage devaluation. 
Unfortunately,  though  devaluation  ultimately  succeeds  in  generating  a 
cumulative payments surplus without disturbing the real equilibrium of  the 
economy, the adjustment process is painful and involves traversing a path in 
which real output is continuously below its previous level. In the short run, 
a  nominal  devaluation  generates  a  real  devaluation  (i.e.,  elP,  rises)  by 
reducing the level of  real  money balances. The real  devaluation, in  turn, 
lowers L" both by raising the product wage (p,  < Gn < 2)  and by increasing 
the real price of  imported inputs to the nontradables ~ector.~  More formally, 
set e = gx = g"  and treat I'  as endogenous in  the model of  section 6.1. 
Grinding through the usual manipulations then yields6 
(30) 
where 
ink?  = -  sal/Al < 0, 
A, = {E  + C,S  + O;bl  + alOf[cx  + C,S  + c,pJI(l -  s)]}  > 0 
and  p = -dLx/dL" s 1 is  the  fraction  of  workers  laid  off  in  the  non- 
tradables sector who gain employment in the export sector. 
Whether  or  not  contraction  in  the  nontradables  sector  leads  to  open 
unemployment depends in large measure on the flexibility of  export sector 
Fig. 6.4  The impact of a devaluation when export sector technology is 
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technology. The rise in P,  increases labor demand in the export sector at a 
given nominal wage. If  technology is relatively flexible, job creation in the 
export sector exceeds layoffs in  the  nontradables sector and,  though real 
output  declines  (by  the  amount  [w" -  wX]dLn),  open  unemployment  is 
averted. The flexibility condition that export sector technology must satisfy is 
(31)  ufK(i - of) + u+Ief  > ow,Lw(i  -  of)^,, 
where A, is evaluated at p =  1. When (31) holds, the economy follows a 
path such as ABC in  figure 6.4. Devaluation produces a strong increase in 
export sector labor demand that bids up  wx by  AB  in the short run.  The 
balance of  payments shifts to a surplus, and as the money stock rises over 
time, P, and L"  increase. The tightening of  the labor market pushs wx up 
further as the economy moves toward the long-run equilibrium C along the 
LL  schedule. Open  unemployment never  emerges,  but  the  worsening  in 
underemployment  on  the  transition  path  results  in  real  output  being 
everywhere below its predevaluation level. 
Figure 6.5 applies when export sector technology is relatively inflexible 
and fails to satisfy (31).  The LL schedule is steeper in slope than the ray OF, 
reflecting the fact that the export sector is incapable of  absorbing all of the 
labor released by  the nontradables sector without a decrease in the nominal 
wage.  There  is  an  initial  phase  AB  of  open  unemployment  and  falling 
nominal  (and  real)  wages  in  the  export  sector;  over  the  medium  run, 
devaluation works principally by  reducing import demand and has effects 
similar  to  import  controls.  Once  point  B  is  reached,  full  employment 
prevails  and  on  the  remainder  of  the  path  wx  rises  steadily, eventually 
surpassing its previous steady-state level. 
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6.5  Export Subsidies 
The basic  problem with  using  quotas or devaluation  to remedy current 
account deficits is that the import volume contracts. Under weak conditions, 
the curtailment in the import volume reduces labor demand in the high-wage 
manufacturing  sector,  thereby  exacerbating underemployment. Conversely, 
if  underemployment  is to be lessened, import flows must be increased, not 
reduced. This makes it natural to consider export subsidies as an alternative 
policy  that  might  reconcile  the  potentially  conflicting  objectives  of  ex- 
panding import flows and improving the trade balance. 
When analyzing the repercussions  of an export subsidy, some assumption 
must be made about how  the subsidy is financed.  Consider first the rather 
optimistic case in which the subsidy is financed by an increase in lump-sum 
taxes.  Letting  v  denote the ad valorem subsidy,  the  basic  model  (without 
import restrictions) changes only in equations (1) and ( 
(1')  P, = e(1 + v) 
(  1  0")  Y  = R(P,, P,, L", Lx) - evX, 




&IFx  = u~A~'[E  -  yX(a$/  + ~/0;)] 3 0. 
a4  = {a;;[0p  + (1 - 0;)0;]  + a,n,efe;}/Op. 
The impact on underemployment is  uncertain,  reflecting  the conflicting 
effects on manufacturing  sector labor demand of a higher product wage and 
a lower real price of  imported intermediates  (elP, 1).  Unlike with a deval- 
uation, L, may increase. Furthermore, when labor demand contracts, a com- 
parison of (30) and (32) shows that the decline in L, is smaller under an export 
subsidy if and only if 
(33)  E + ens > a$/?, . 
This is precisely the condition for a tighter quota on intermediates utilized by 
the nontradables sector to lower L, (when the implicit tariff is initially zero). 
The condition reappears  here  because  an  export  subsidy  differs  from  a 
devaluation  only  in  that  it  lowers  instead  of  increases  the  real  price  of 
imports. A duality proposition  thus links the employment effects of quotas, 
devaluation, and export subsidies:  if  a more restrictive  quota  on imported 
inputs  used  by  the  nontradables  sector exacerbates underemployment, an 
export subsidy has a less adverse (and possibly favorable) impact on under- 
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Export subsidies also compare favorably with devaluation in being less likely 
to create open unemployment. This is  not  only because manufacturing sector 
employment is  likely to decline less. Rather, in  addition, an export subsidy 
provides greater stimulus to labor demand in the export sector by lowering the 
real price of  imported intermediates, generating a favorable cross-price effect 
that is absent under a devaluation. The counterpart to (31) is 
~fK(1  -  0f) + 0$,0f  > @u~[E  -  yX(u$[ + dO;)]L"/LXA,  , 
which is less stringent than (31) even when (33) holds as an equality so that 
an export subsidy and  a devaluation contract manufacturing sector employ- 
ment to the same extent." 
The long-run outcome may be found by setting s = 0 in (32). This yields 
the conclusion that L"  rises whenever 
(34)  e '  UaX  * 
Again, this  is  the condition for a tighter  quota on imports used  by  non- 
tradables sector firms to lower L".  Thus, in the long run, an export subsidy 
has  qualitatively  the  same  effect  on  underemployment  as  import  liber- 
alization in the nontradables sector (when s,t = 0 initially). 
Figure 6.6 extends the comparison of export promotion and devaluation to 
cover the entire adjustment process. The initial equilibrium is A, and ABC is 
the transition path on the assumption that export sector technology is flexible 
enough (i.e., [31] is satisfied) to prevent the emergence of  open unemploy- 
ment. Since devaluation is neutral in the long run, the new steady state lies on 
the ray OF. 
The M'W  and L"L"  schedules define the  transition  path  following the 
introduction of  an  export  subsidy. Extremely  weak  conditions suffice to 
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guarantee  an  improvement  in  the  payments  balance.  It  can  be  shown, 
however, that the cumulative payments surplus is always smaller than under 
a comparable devaluation. 
If  (34) holds,  underemployment diminishes  and  the  real  export  sector 
wage increases unambiguously in the long run (kX  > px >  pn).  The new 
long-run equilibrium, therefore, lies to the northwest of C.  At  all points on 
the transition path, the real wage in  the export sector and  real income are 
higher  than  under  a  devaluation.  The  cumulative payments  surplus  is 
smaller, but this merely reflects the fact that the price level rises less. The 
real money supply is higher at E than at C (and the initial steady state A).  I' 
It is more difficult to compare export subsidies and devaluation when (33) 
holds but not (34). Figure 6.7 depicts the time paths of real income Y'  in this 
case. In the short run, a devaluation results in greater underemployment and 
lower real  income than  an  export  subsidy. At  some point,  however, this 
ranking is reversed. Over the long run, real income declines under an export 
subsidy  but  eventually  returns  to  its  previous  steady-state  level  under  a 
devaluation. 
I end on two cautionary notes. First, these results demonstrate only that 
under certain conditions an  infinitesimally small export subsidy compares 
favorably with a devaluation. As such, they show that a plausible case can be 
made for the introduction of  some export subsidy; they  do not, however, 
indicate how  large a subsidy can be justified (i.e., the size of  the optimal 
export subsidy). 
Second, although export subsidies may expand the tax base by increasing 
real income, they normally will  not be  self-financing. Active measures to 
increase tax revenues or cut expenditures will be needed in order to avoid a 
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deterioration in the fiscal deficit and a possible  worsening  in the payments 
balance.  Suppose, for example, that the government  expenditures  are fixed 
in  real  terms  and  that  revenues  derive  from  a  proportional  income  or 
value-added tax z.  In this case, if the fiscal budget FB is initially in balance'* 
..  P,X  pne" 
Y-ldFBIP,  = -  (1 -  z) - -  e;(l  - +),,,  (35)  Y  Y 
where  q = L"/k,. The  second  term  reflects  the  revenue  gain  from  the 
reduction in underemployment.  For believable values, this gain is very small 
compared to the direct worsening of the deficit caused by the introduction of 
the  subsidy.  For  instance,  if  z = 0.20 and  the  share  of  nonoil  exports in 
GNP is 0.05, then the direct revenue loss equals 0.04. Turning to the indirect 
gain, it can be checked that, extreme cases aside, the employment elasticity 
q  will not exceed 0.20.13  With this large value for q,  02  = + = 0.50, and 
PnQ"/Y = 0.60, the indirect revenue gain is still only 0.006, leaving a large 
residual deficit. 
6.6  Concluding Observations 
Since the end of  198 1,  employment  growth has  virtually  ceased  despite 
reductions in real wages in excess of  30 percent.  In this chapter I have put 
forward the thesis  that conventional  microtheoretic  factors can account for 
much  of  the  extreme worsening  in  underemployment  seen in the  first five 
years of adjustment to the debt crisis. Tight import quotas (until July  1985), 
a heavily depreciated currency,  and huge increases in internal energy prices 
have greatly reduced usage of intermediate inputs complementary to domestic 
labor.  In  short, as regards job creation, relative  prices  were  wrong.  More 
moderate increases in internal energy prices (for industrial users) and greater 
use of export subsidies instead of real devaluation to attain external balance 
would have allowed adjustment to proceed with at least a lesser increase in 
underemployment.  Unfortunately,  each of  these  policies  would  have  con- 
flicted with the task of reducing the fiscal deficit, a task already made very 
difficult by increased debt service and sharply declining terms of trade. 
Appendix 
substitute for Q" in (5) from (6): 
To  derive  the  expressions  for L"  and  I"  given  in  (13) and  (14), first 
(Al)  L"  = c;K"/c:  . 
Now differentiate (Al) and note that C,CIC,Cj  = ujj,  where u,  is the Allen 
partial elasticity of substitution between factors  i and j.  This gives 486  Edward F.  Buffie 
Substituting  for  G" from  (3)  and  utilizing  the  adding-up  restrictions, 
-uuB,  = uLK8,  + u,e,  and  -uKKeK  = a,,€),  + u,e,,  (A2) becomes 
(A3)  i"  =  -ay,[uL;((l  - 0;)  + ufIO,"]p,  + [u&(1 - 0;)  + oj$~;]i-" 
+ e;(u,;  - u;,)g"  . 
In  the  case  where  the  production  function  is  separable  between  primary 
factors and imported inputs, u,  = u,,  = uvI and (A3) simplifies to 
('44)  jn  = [~:~(i  - e;)  + ~;,e;](i~  - aynFj~). 
From equations (2) and (3): 
Substituting this expression into (A4) gives equation (13) in the text 
('45)  jn  = u,Pn - adg"  , 
where 
al = [i - ay,(i -  e;)][~:~(i  - e;)  + ~;~e;]/e; 
u2 = e;[u:K(i  - e;)  + ~;,e,"]/e; . 
The expression for I"  stated in (14) is obtained by the same procedure. 
7  Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 
Financial Intermediation, 
Inflation, and Growth 
In  previous  chapters  I  have  often  emphasized  the  self-reinforcing  and 
stagflationary  nature  of  the  various  macroeconomic  mechanisms  linking 
large  fiscal  deficits,  high  inflation,  financial  disintermediation,  and  slow 
growth. At present, Mexico, like so many other Latin American countries, 
seems to be trapped in a self-perpetuating  spiral of this sort: high inflation 
provokes a flight of funds from the banking system; the low level of financial 
intermediation  curtails the supply of  bank  loans  for productive investment 